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I. INTRODUCTION
JUSTICE Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in his dissent in animportant early antitrust case, Northern Securities Co. v. UnitedStates, that “[g]reat cases like hard cases make bad law.”1 Holmes
went on to explain that great cases are so-called “not by reason of their
real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feel-
* Marilyn Jeanne Johnson Distinguished Faculty Fellow, Professor of Law, and for-
mer Dean, SMU Dedman School of Law. Of Counsel, Locke Lord, Dallas, Texas. B.A,
J.D., University of Texas; LL.M. Columbia University. The author thanks Professor Julie
Patterson Forrester for her editorial comments, Katherine Geddes, ‘17, and Alexa
Naumovich, ‘18, for able research assistance, and the Glenn Portman Faculty Research
Fund for its generous support of this project. This article is written in memory of and
tribute to Professor Joe McKnight, who served on the SMU law faculty for almost 60 years.
Joe was truly an institution here who left a lasting legacy from his role in reforming the
family code in Texas, among other varied and significant accomplishments. Joe was a legal
historian par excellence who always sought contemporary meaning from his studies of legal
history. I hope that this article accomplishes a little of the same.
1. 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Of course, Holmes was no friend
of the Sherman Act in general, writing that it was “a humbug based on economic ignorance
and incompetence.” Letter from Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 23,
1910), in HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932 163, 163 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961)
(1941). See also Alfred S. Neely, “A humbug based on economic ignorance and incompe-
tence”–Antitrust in the Eyes of Justice Holmes, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1; Spencer Weber Wal-
ler, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The Judging Years: The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice
Holmes, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 283 (1994).
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ings and distorts the judgment.”2 He went on to say that those cases exert
“a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what . . . was clear [appear]
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.”3
He appears to have been correct some of the time4 but not necessarily
most of the time.5
This essay, however, considers a converse but related question: Do bad
antitrust decisions, as based on their facts, sometimes make good law?
That is, do wrongly decided antitrust cases, when considered on their
merits, sometimes have a lasting impact on the law even though the deci-
sion by most accounts should simply be overruled? At first glance, our
system of stare decisis, in which correct decisions have precedential value
and wrong decisions are simply overruled, would seem to not tolerate
such a result.
The question is germane because some old-dog antitrust decisions,
much maligned and probably wrongly decided even way back when,
maintain significant currency in contemporary antitrust parlance. These
cases are oft-cited and relied on now, even given their very shaky pedi-
gree. They are cases that initially seem ripe for overruling but, for reasons
I will explore, probably never will be. Thus, the question is, are bad anti-
trust cases actually responsible for making good law? If so, why do cases
in such disrepute on their merits have such staying power, particularly
when so much early antitrust precedent is simply ignored today? Two
cases, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)6 and Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,7 stand out as examples of this phenomenon.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST PRECEDENT
Historically, the Supreme Court has defined and shaped antitrust law
much as it has constitutional law. Congress likely intended for the Court
2. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 400.
3. Id. at 401.
4. In Northern Securities, Holmes argued that the majority was in error in applying
the Sherman Act literally to all restraints of trade that affected interstate commerce. He
asserted vigorously that, as a matter of common sense and given the Act’s common law
heritage, the act was intended to prohibit only “unreasonable” restraints of trade. Id. at
400–11. Northern Securities was by all accounts a “great” case since it involved a merger
between two major competing railroads involving railroad barons J.P. Morgan, Edward
Harriman, and J.J. Hill. In 1911, in the equally great case involving the Rockefeller oil
empire, Holmes’s view prevailed and the Court adopted “the rule of reason.” Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
Holmes also famously dissented in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 409–13 (1911), a case in which the Court ruled that resale price maintenance
violated the Sherman Act because of its impact on dealers and others down the product
distribution chain. Holmes argued forcefully that competition would be better served by
allowing manufacturers to control the price of their products downstream. In 2007, ninety-
six years later, the majority of the Court finally agreed with Holmes and overruled Dr.
Miles. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
5. See, e.g., LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., DO GREAT CASES MAKE BAD LAW? (2014)
(arguing that often the Supreme Court has considered great cases in constitutional law and
issued lasting, landmark opinions).
6. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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to have this principal role given the language of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits “conspirac[ies] . . . in restraint of trade” and monopolization
without further guidance or definitions.8 Thus, as with the question of
what constitutes free speech under the First Amendment, the Court has
had to try to provide content to the Sherman Act’s broad-based language
over the past, at this writing, 117 years.
At best, the Court’s antitrust track record is uneven.9 Certainly, its
view of the law has evolved and changed as economic learning and under-
standing of what type of business conduct is truly anticompetitive has ad-
vanced. That is as it should be. But as the Court’s view of what conduct
runs afoul of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act—passed in 1914 to
provide more content and specificity to the law—has progressed, one re-
sult is that some earlier decisions, which are clearly wrong by today’s eco-
nomic reckoning, lie fallow, ignored but not overruled.10 They are just
out there in the judicial ether.
Of course, there are other significant problems with antitrust prece-
dent. Apart from considerations of the likely economic impact of con-
duct, individual judicial predilections have far too often colored decision-
making and, dating back to the Standard Oil decision in 1911, personnel
changes in the Court have frequently resulted in dramatic reversals of
antitrust policy. In Standard Oil, Chief Justice Edward White, who was
elevated from his position as Associate Justice in December 1910, found
himself in the majority in urging the adoption of the rule of reason.11 He
had dissented in two earlier cases, arguing that the Court was using an
analysis that was too rigid and urging the adoption of a more flexible
approach.12
The transition from the Warren Court to the Burger Court caused an
equal antitrust sea change. There, the disagreement stemmed from what
the fundamental antitrust goal should be. After a period of dramatic ex-
pansion of what constituted an antitrust offense, the government sud-
denly could and did lose cases under the Burger Court. The Warren
Court’s populist view that antitrust should also strive to protect small bus-
iness was quickly jettisoned and replaced by an increasing reliance on
efficiency considerations.
8. 15 U.S.C.S §1 (2017).
9. For a particularly critical view, see William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller,
Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1811, 1813 (1995) (characterizing
the Supreme Court as enjoying “a few shining successes and a greater number of dismal
failures.”).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Klor’s, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933); see also Joshua Wright, Comment, Von’s Grocery and the Concentra-
tion-Price Relationship in Grocery Retail, 48 UCLA L. REV. 743, 746–47 (2001) (arguing
that “Von’s Grocery is no longer capable of any intelligible contribution to antitrust doc-
trine” and analyzing “the risks of allowing outdated and weak precedent from the 1960s . . .
to remain valid law”).
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 100 (1911).
12. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 343–74 (1897); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 578 (1898).
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Paralleling that shift was the rise in prominence of the Chicago School
of Economics and its somewhat revisionist history of congressional in-
tent.13 But the Chicago School’s emphasis on market behavior rather
than market structure did find judicial receptivity,14 as did its argument
that one could not have its antitrust cake and eat it too; that is, antitrust
law could not, in any sensible, rational way, protect competition, spurred
by innovation and efficiency, while providing refuge for small, often inef-
ficient businesses.15 Thus came the demise of locally owned dry goods
stores and the rise of Walmart to small-town America, providing en-
hanced goods and services at big-city reduced prices to those living in
rural and semirural America.
III. TO OVERRULE OR NOT
While the Supreme Court historically has been disinclined to overrule
its earlier antitrust decisions, no matter how awful, in more recent years it
has bit the bullet and overhauled vertical restraints doctrine, replacing
the per se rule with the rule of reason across the board.16 The modern
Court favors the rule of reason, another drastic change from a Warren
Court that favored the predictability of the per se rule, even taken to
extremes.17 Of course, reliance on the rule of reason does provide flexi-
bility for a court seeking to assess the competitive consequences of mar-
ketplace conduct.
But what about these old cases that the Court has not overruled, but
arguably should?18 Part of the answer must be that it is one thing to de-
nounce the per se rule as applied to a class of restraints, such as resale
price maintenance, and replace it with the rule of reason (or vice versa
13. See. e.g., Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-
Examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359 (1993).
14. Of course, that receptivity was enhanced significantly by the appointment of lead-
ing Chicago School proponents like Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook to the federal
judiciary.
15. Often those inefficiencies derive from the lack of purchasing volume, which
retards the ability of smaller companies to secure the volume supplier discounts offered to
larger companies.
16. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7–10 (1997); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
17. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972) (“Whether or not we
would decide this case the same way under the rule of reason used by the District Court is
irrelevant to the issue before us. The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining
difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction
of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another
sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.”) (footnote omitted).
18. Of course, lower courts face difficulties when the Supreme Court does not over-
rule earlier precedent that it subsequently disagrees with. There is authority that where the
Court adopts a new standard without overruling the previous discarded standard, the lower
courts “must apply the new standard and reach the result dictated under that new stan-
dard” since “‘results reached under the old standard’ are no longer ‘binding precedent.’”
United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting) (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER ET. AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 31
(2016)).
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for that matter) but it is quite another to overrule cases in which the rule
is simply misapplied to the facts of the case.19 In other words, per se rules
are easy fodder to overrule. A per se rule traditionally has meant that the
conduct is unlawful, no ifs, ands, or buts. It does not create a rebuttable
presumption and is, or used to be, a bright-line rule that dispensed with
the necessity of defining relevant markets or assessing market power. If
the Court determines that a particular class of conduct previously consid-
ered per se unlawful may have competitive merit or may sometimes en-
hance efficiencies, it is relatively simple to overrule the conflicting
precedent and discard the per se rule, replacing it with the rule of reason
or today even the so-called quick look rule of reason.20
The bulk of antitrust analysis is much more fluid than the per se rule
permits. For example, the rule of reason requires a balancing of procom-
petitive and anticompetitive effects and can often seem like comparing
apples to oranges. Section 2 analysis involves a relevant market definition
and then a determination of whether a dominant firm has engaged in
exclusionary conduct. The former requires an economic assessment of
consumer demand both with respect to products or services and geogra-
phy. The Supreme Court has arguably gotten the relevant market assess-
ment wrong on a number of occasions,21 but its misapplication of
economic theory does not give rise to overruling in later cases with differ-
ent facts.
As to the second Section 2 prong, the Supreme Court has recognized
that “the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competi-
tion, are myriad.”22 While the Court may theoretically overrule prior de-
terminations of what constitutes exclusionary conduct, it has not chosen
to do so. It has rather, in recent years, tended to reduce the “myriad”
possibilities by deciding that certain conduct, such as price squeezes,23 is
not exclusionary and by providing a test for predatory pricing.24 Non-
price-related exclusionary conduct, however, remains a work in progress,
19. That is, of course, what appellate courts typically do when reversing lower court
decisions, but that is distinct from overruling prior precedent that an appellate court now
determines was wrongly decided. The prior precedent is, by definition, a different case with
different facts.
20. It turns out sometimes the quick look is not so quick. See Cal. Dentists Ass’n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499,
511 (4th Cir. 2002) (quick look “too quick”); see also Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416
F.3d 29, 34–37 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998); Chi.
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v.
Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
22. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam)).
23. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 442 (2009).
24. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24
(1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
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clouded with uncertainty.25
Further, Section 2 cases in particular involve dueling economists, opin-
ing directly opposing views on everything from the appropriate relevant
market to the competitive impact of targeted big firm conduct. Those dis-
agreements among experts tend to further complicate already complex
cases as juries and judges must sort out fact from fiction. It would seem-
ingly take a Supreme Court decision that was based on a totally implausi-
ble economic theory to qualify for overruling in a later monopolization
case.26
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the antimerger provision, has produced a
lot of Supreme Court precedent, most of it dated and much of it highly
suspect relics from a different antitrust age. As one leading commentator
observed over thirty years ago, “Merger enforcement in the United States
has often been erratic and always controversial.”27 But the prospects for
the Court to overrule earlier precedent seem slim to none for a number
of reasons: First, the Supreme Court has not decided a merger case on the
merits in over forty years, in stark contrast to earlier years when it some-
times had multiple merger cases in a term.28 Second, even if the Court
granted certiorari in a merger case and used the “new learning,”29 Section
7’s statutory language and the two-pronged analytical approach for as-
sessing the competitive impact of mergers make overruling earlier cases
problematical.
The operative statutory language is that a merger is unlawful where its
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.”30 That is, the government does not have to prove an actual
lessening of competition to block a merger, only its likelihood. Thus, each
case boils down to a judgment call or prediction about the future compet-
itive impact of the merger. The Court might in hindsight disagree with
one or more of its earlier decisions, but since each new case requires a
similar judicial assessment of the future, it is simply unnecessary to over-
rule those prior decisions. Only if the Court wished to employ a new legal
standard, such as it has in the vertical restraints area, would it require the
overruling of earlier bad merger decisions. Instead, a plethora of them
25. See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, The Incredible Shrinking Antirust Law and the Anti-
trust Gap, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 67, 80–95 (2013).
26. As will be discussed, Alcoa might be an example.
27. Robert Pitofsky, Foreword to THOMAS W. BRUNNER, THOMAS G. KRAT-
TENMAKER, ROBERT A. SKITOL & ANN ADAMS WEBSTER, MERGERS IN THE NEW ANTI-
TRUST ERA v, v (1985).
28. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, passed in 1976, and the issu-
ance of Merger Guidelines, first by the Justice Department and now jointly by the DOJ
and the FTC, have had the effect of largely shifting merger enforcement to the enforce-
ment agencies prior to consummation of proposed mergers. See generally C. Paul Rogers
III, A Concise History of Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws of the United States, 24
NAT’ L. SCH. INDIA REV. 10, 21 (2013).
29. See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (Harvey J.
Goldschmid et. al eds., 1974).
30. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2017).
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remain on the books, to be continually avoided and ignored.31
IV. BROWN SHOE
Modern merger jurisprudence certainly begins with the 1962 Brown
Shoe decision, one of the most maligned antitrust decisions in history. It
is there that the Court seemingly spoke out of both sides of its mouth
when it held that the Clayton Act was to protect “competition, not com-
petitors” but in the next sentence stated “[b]ut we cannot fail to recog-
nize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses.”32 It went on to hold as a basis for
finding a Section 7 violation that retail shoe outlets that became inte-
grated through their acquisition by Brown as a shoe manufacturer had a
competitive advantage over unintegrated outlets. The Court found that
the cost savings in distribution enabled the integrated retailers to sell
shoes at cheaper prices than unintegrated retail outlets.33 The fact that
consumers would have to pay higher prices for shoes in order to protect
the unintegrated shoe retailers seems to never have occurred to the
Court.
Thus, the Brown Shoe Court in effect held that efficiency gains were
not only not procompetitive, but were, in fact, anticompetitive. In fact, in
the upside-down world of the Warren Court, Brown’s defense counsel
had apparently felt compelled to argue that the vertical integration would
not result in any cost savings or consumer benefit.34 The Court did not
buy it, instead, to the defendants chagrin, using efficiency gains as an anti-
trust sword rather than the potential shield that they should be.
It is fair to say that Brown Shoe represents the epoch of antitrust popu-
lism.35 It is certainly the poster child for the proposition that antitrust law
cannot have the dual goals of promoting consumer welfare and protecting
competitors. In addition, today it is quite unlikely that the government
would take a second glance at the merger given the market shares in-
volved and the then highly competitive nature of the shoe industry. So,
the obvious question is, what is it about the case that endures?
To quickly recapture the facts, the case involved the 1956 merger of the
Brown Shoe Company and G.R. Kinney Co. Prior to the acquisition,
Brown Shoe was the fourth largest U.S. shoe manufacturer, but it con-
31. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970);
United States v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. First
City Nat’l Bank of Hous., 386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable),
377 U.S. 271 (1964).
32. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
33. Id. at 343–44.
34. Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Pol-
icy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 456–57 (1965).
35. Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth W. Vorrasi, The Remarkable 50-Year Legacy of
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, ANTITRUST, Spring 2012, at 47, 48–49.
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trolled only 4% of the market.36 Kinney was even smaller, with only
0.5%, but it operated the largest U.S. family-style shoe store chain.37
However, it accounted for only 1.2% of all U.S. retail shoe sales.38 Brown
Shoe operated its own retail shoe stores that competed with Kinney in
some locales. The acquisition gave Brown Shoe 7.2% of all U.S. retail
shoe stores and 2.3% of all U.S. shoe outlets.39
The Department of Justice (DOJ) challenged the entire merger be-
cause of (a) the foreclosure of Brown Shoe’s manufacturing rivals from
access to Kinney’s retail stores; (b) the combining of the two companies
at the manufacturing level; and (c) the combining of the two companies’
retail outlets. After trial, the district court dismissed the horizontal effects
case at the manufacturing level40 but found that the horizontal effects in
retailing and the vertical effects of the foreclosure of Brown Shoe’s man-
ufacturing rivals from Kinney’s retail outlets violated Section 7 and or-
dered total divestiture.41 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Warren, affirmed the findings of illegality and divestiture.42
The Chief Justice began his long opinion with an extended analysis of
the legislative history of the 1950 amendments to Section 7,43 which he
said were prompted by the desire to check a “rising tide of economic
concentration” in the United States and “the desirability of retaining ‘lo-
cal control’ over industry” as well as “the protection of small busi-
nesses.”44 According to the Court, the “keystone” to stopping that rising
tide was Congress’s grant of judicial “authority for arresting mergers at a
time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce
was still in its incipiency.”45
Although the Court’s reading of congressional history provides the ju-
diciary with seemingly sweeping powers to enjoin mergers, it did strike
some balance, noting that some mergers may be procompetitive.46 It gave
as an example a merger between two small companies to enable the new
firm to compete more effectively with larger firms dominating the rele-
vant market.47 In oft-cited language, the Court emphasized that “as a
whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the
36. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 302–03.
37. Id. at 303.
38. Id. at 298, 303.
39. Id. at 345.
40. The government did not appeal.
41. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 304.
42. Id. at 346. Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 355 (Clark, J., concur-
ring). Justice Harlan dissented in part and concurred in part in a separate opinion. Id. at
357 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Justices Frankfurter and White did
not take part in the decision. Id. at 346 (majority opinion).
43. See Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18).
44. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315–16.
45. Id. at 317.
46. Id. at 319.
47. The Court also noted that a merger between a financially healthy company and a
failing one could be considered procompetitive. Id.
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protection of competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain merg-
ers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competi-
tion.”48 It went on to note, however, that “Congress used the words ‘may
be substantially to lessen competition’ to indicate that its concern was
with probabilities, not certainties.”49 But only “[m]ergers with a probable
anticompetitive effect,” not those with “ephemeral possibilities,” were to
be proscribed.50
The Court provided some guidance about how it intended to accom-
plish its mission by observing that “Congress indicated plainly that a
merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its particular in-
dustry.”51 Then, in its famous footnote 38, the Court noted that market
share statistics of the industry leaders and of the merging parties “are, of
course, the primary index of market power; but only a further examina-
tion of the particular market—its structure, history and probable future—
can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompeti-
tive effect of the merger.”52
In first tackling the vertical aspect of the merger arising from Brown,
the manufacturer, acquiring Kinney, the retailer, the Court noted that
defining the relevant product and geographic market is a “necessary
predicate” to finding a violation.53 It held that the “reasonable inter-
changeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the prod-
uct itself and [its] substitutes” constitutes “[t]he outer boundaries of a
product market.”54 The Court went on to say that “within this broad mar-
ket, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes.”55 According to the Court, men’s,
women’s, and children’s shoes constituted three distinct product markets
since each was recognized by the public, each line was manufactured in
separate plants, and each had unique characteristics directed toward a
distinct class of customers.56
In considering whether the vertical portion of the merger created a
“probable” anticompetitive effect, the Court first focused on “the size of
the share of the market foreclosed.”57 It concluded that since Brown was
the fourth largest shoe manufacturer and Kinney was the largest indepen-
dent chain of family shoe stores in the country, “in this industry, no
merger between a manufacturer and an independent retailer could in-
48. Id. at 320.
49. Id. at 323.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 321–22.
52. Id. 322 n.38.
53. Id. at 324 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593 (1957)).
54. Id. at 325.
55. Id.
56. The Court rejected further bifurcation of the product market by rejecting the de-
fendant’s assertion that medium-priced shoes should be differentiated from low-priced
shoes as “unrealistic.” Id. at 326.
57. Id. at 328.
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volve a larger potential market foreclosure.”58 In so holding, the Court
emphasized that Brown sold about 25 million pairs of shoes during the
year of the merger with assets of $72 million while Kinney sold eight mil-
lion pairs of shoes and had assets of about $18 million.59 The Court either
forgot or decided to ignore the fact that Brown had all of 4% of U.S. shoe
production while Kinney sold about 1.2% of U.S. retail shoe sales.
The Brown Shoe Court was also worried about “the trend toward con-
centration in the industry” since the district court “found a tendency of
the acquiring manufacturers to become increasingly important sources of
supply for their acquired outlets.”60 That meant “the foreclosure of inde-
pendent manufacturers from markets otherwise open to them.”61 Brown
Shoe’s argument that the shoe industry was “dynamically competitive”
and composed of large numbers of manufacturers and retailers thus fell
on deaf ears.62
Thus, as noted earlier, the Court cared not a whit about efficiency gains
or cost savings through integration, which could produce lower prices for
consumers. It was, rather, focused on keeping small, unintegrated sellers
in the fray, no matter the downstream costs of doing so. Further, its con-
cern about the trend toward concentration seems, with fifty-five years of
hindsight, misplaced given how resolutely unconcentrated the shoe indus-
try was then. The Court rather seems to have circled back on itself and
considered “ephemeral possibilities” as a basis for finding illegality.
The Court next turned to the horizontal effect side of the case stem-
ming from the merger of the Brown and Kinney retail shoe outlets. It
stayed with the three lines of commerce or product markets but diverged
from the nation as a whole geographic market it had employed in the
vertical part of the case. Instead, the Court focused on submarkets con-
sisting of “those cities with a population exceeding 10,000 and their envi-
rons in which both Brown and Kinney retailed shoes through their own
outlets.”63 The market shares varied considerably among the various
groups of cities considered, but the Court chose to focus on the 118 cities
where the combined shares exceeded 5% for at least one line of com-
merce.64 The Court expressed concern about a slippery slope that might
result from approval of the merger since it might require it to approve
future acquisitions with similar market shares. If so, then “[t]he oligopoly
58. Id. at 331–32.
59. Id. at 331.
60. Id. at 332.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 333.
63. Id. at 339.
64. The Court noted that “[i]n 47 cities, their share exceeded 5% in all three lines.” Id.
at 343. In its opinion the Court also identified certain groups of cities in which the market
share for one line of commerce was particularly high. For example, the Court noted that
“in 32 separate cities . . . the combined share of Brown and Kinney sales of women’s shoes
. . . exceeded 20%” while “[i]n 31 cities . . . the combined share of children’s shoes sales
exceeded 20%,” with 6 of those cities exceeding 40%. Id. at 342–43.
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Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered.”65
It was here that the Court went into its oft-criticized double-speak,
favoring competition over competitors but actually basing its reasoning
on “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.”66 It went
so far as to note “that occasional higher costs and prices might result from
the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.”67 It also took its
admonition to arrest potentially anticompetitive mergers “in their incipi-
ency” seriously, particularly when “tendencies [toward concentration] are
being accelerated through giant steps striding across a hundred cities at a
time.”68 In support of this sweeping statement, the Court pointed to the
fact that Brown was now the second largest shoe retailer, with about
1,600 retail outlets that accounted for all of 7.2% of the nation’s retail
shoe stores and 2.3% of the country’s retail shoe outlets.69
Of course, today those numbers would draw only brief, passing atten-
tion from the enforcement agencies. Those few cities in which the com-
bined market shares were significant might be subject to partial
divestiture or, today, when mergers are viewed prospectively and not ret-
rospectively, to a conditional approval subject to the sale of stores in
those communities. Although the Brown Shoe Court ordered total divest-
iture, it did arguably set the stage for partial or limited divestiture in its
footnote 65, where it noted that an overlap of only a small portion of the
merging parties businesses would not immunize the acquisition from Sec-
tion 7 but might well impact the equitable relief decreed.70
Reaction to the Brown Shoe decision was predictably strong and nega-
tive and was generally directed at the Court’s populist approach to Sec-
tion 7 at the expense of lower prices and efficiency gains.71 For the most
part, the criticism has continued unabated.72 One commentator noted
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id. at 344.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 346. The Court initially used “incipiency” in the context of its review of the
legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendments to
Section 7. In doing so, it arguably accurately reflected Congress’s conception of “competi-
tion” to refer to situations in which a large number of small businesses competed. Further,
the legislative history makes it clear that Congress wanted a merger statute that allowed
for more aggressive enforcement. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTER-
PRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 210 (2005); see also Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 234 (1960).
69. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 345–46. The difference in the two percentages accounts
for the fact that shoes were sold at retail through department stores and other retail outlets
that were not just shoe stores.
70. Id. at 337 n.65. See William F. Rogers & Sanford M. Litvack, Brown Shoe: The
Guidance of a Footnote, 1963 WASH U. L.Q. 192 (1963).
71. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). The decision did have its early supporters. See, e.g., Milton
Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REC. N.Y.C. B. ASS’N 411,
433 (1962) (asserting that the Court rebuffed the government’s “efforts to convert Section
7 into a per se statute” by adopting a functional, contextual approach).
72. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 210–16 (1978) (asserting that Brown Shoe “has considerable claim to the title” of
“worst antitrust essay ever written”); John L. Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J.L. &
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that the decision appears to recognize only two legitimate reasons for
merger at all: to permit acquisition of a failing company and to allow two
small firms to seek efficiencies that would enable them to better compete
with dominant firms.73 Perhaps most telling is the assertion that the opin-
ion shows that the Court could not distinguish between competition and
monopolization.74 Of course, no small part of the criticism is that the de-
cision unleashed the Warren Court on merger cases of every stripe—hori-
zontal, vertical, and so-called conglomerate—leading to Justice Stewart’s
famous comment in his dissent in Von’s Grocery that “[t]he sole consis-
tency” he could find in Section 7 litigation is that “the Government al-
ways wins.”75
The government’s merger win streak came to an abrupt halt in 1974 in
the General Dynamics case.76 The opinion was written by none other
than Justice Stewart, who now commanded a majority thanks to four Bur-
ger Court appointees and the loss of three Warren Court justices.77 With
its new majority, the Court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the gov-
ernment’s challenge of a merger in the coal industry even though it held
the government’s evidence of market share statistics and industry concen-
tration was sufficient to condemn the merger under Brown Shoe and its
1960s progeny.78 But those statistics, the Court noted, were based on the
acquired party’s past coal production and did not necessarily equate to its
present and future ability to compete for the long-term contracts due to
its lack of uncommitted reserves. Thus, the Court found that there was
insufficient evidence to establish any probable anticompetitive effect.79
General Dynamics is widely thought to be a watershed in Section 7
jurisprudence as the Court transitioned its earlier populist conception of
competition to one that was truer to a consumer welfare paradigm.80
Then, the 1982 Department of Justice Guidelines, promulgated under As-
sistant Attorney General William Baxter, seemed to depart sharply from
ECON. 81, 143 (1975) (noting that the evidence accepted by the Court against Brown was
“extraordinarily weak” and “bordered on fiction,” particularly as it related to the “extent
of retail competition between Brown and Kinney, and the trend toward increasing
concentration”).
73. See STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 326 (1993) (citing Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 346).
74. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 124 (2d ed. 2001) (“One has no sense
that the Court had any notion of how a nonmonopolistic merger might affect competi-
tion.”); Peterman, supra note 72, at 143–44.
75. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
76. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The DOJ also lost two
banking merger cases that term, making it clear that the worm had turned. See United
States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418
U.S. 656 (1974).
77. In the interim since the Von’s Grocery decision, Warren Burger had become Chief
Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist had joined the Court. See, e.g., C.
Paul Rogers III, Perspectives on Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 12 LOY. U. L.J.
301, 306–07 (1981).
78. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 494 n.6.
79. Id. at 501, 503–04.
80. Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 35, at 50.
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Brown Shoe by focusing on the pure economic effect of mergers rather
than “viewing [them] as a threat to the societal fabric” as part of some
more generalized reckoning.81 The guidelines, on one level at least,
evince a further break from Brown Shoe by excluding industry trends
toward concentration as a relevant factor in merger reviews.82
Today most Warren Court merger cases, although not overruled, are
simply ignored by the government enforcement agencies and the federal
courts.83 But not Brown Shoe, which has, if anything, experienced a res-
urrection. Thus, how is it that a much maligned decision that sought to
protect small competitors even at the expense of higher prices, was un-
receptive to lowering costs, and hit upon a 5% relevant market share as
the lynchpin for illegality has become center stage again?
It turns out that the internally contradictory nature of the Brown Shoe
decision is both a blessing and a curse. It has allowed courts in the post-
General Dynamics era to ignore Brown Shoe’s populist notions while still
focusing on its analytical construct. In fact, the General Dynamics Court,
the antithesis of Brown Shoe in philosophy and result, actually relied on it
to support its position that market share statistics, while the primary indi-
cia of market power, must be considered in the context of the market’s
“structure, history and probable future” to truly assess the probable an-
ticompetitive effect of the merger.84 In doing so, it elevated a Brown Shoe
footnote to a central analytical principle for ascertaining likely competi-
tive effect.85
Brown Shoe has, of course, the benefit of being the Supreme Court’s
first merger decision after the Celler-Kefauver Amendments “modern-
ized” Section 7 by expanding it to include asset acquisitions and by mak-
ing it clear that the statute applied not only to mergers between
competitors but also to vertical and conglomerate acquisitions.86 And, in
81. Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 311, 317–18 (1983).
82. William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftman’s View, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 618, 630 (1983) (“An industry trend toward concentration is not a factor that will be
considered, even though it has been used in the past.”).
83. HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, at 208.
84. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962)).
85. Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 35, at 50. The 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines also re-
flect the Brown Shoe, as expanded by General Dynamics, consideration of changing mar-
ket conditions as a factor in interpreting market concentration and market share data. U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.21 (1984) (“[R]ecent or on-going changes in
the market may indicate that the current market share of a particular firm either under-
states or overstates the firm’s future competitive significance.”).
86. Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18). The amendments were long in the works. According to
Brown Shoe, sixteen bills to amend Section 7 were introduced from 1943 to 1949, with full
public hearings being held in three different sessions. 370 U.S. at 311–12. The Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), finally
prompted Congress to act. There, the Court upheld an acquisition by U.S. Steel, the largest
steel producer in the country, of Consolidated Steel, the second largest steel fabricator in
the Western U.S. The government had had to challenge the merger under the Sherman
Act, which requires showing of an actual, as opposed to probable, anticompetitive impact,
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contrast to the criticism of the Court’s solicitude to the protection of
small competitors, the standards it set for defining the relevant market to
measure competitive impact have, although sometimes challenged, stood
the test of time.
As noted, the Court held that definition of the relevant market was “a
necessary predicate” to determining the likely competitive impact of a
merger.87 Since Brown Shoe is the starting place, it is often cited for the
mere proposition that defining the relevant market is the necessary first
step in merger analysis.88 Courts have rebuffed government assertions
that it is not necessary. For example, in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.
the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s claim that a relevant market
definition was just a “means to an end—to enable some measurement of
market power—not an end in itself” by citing Brown Shoe’s famous foot-
note 38 and reiterating that defining the relevant market and considering
it in context provides the appropriate setting for evaluating the likely an-
ticompetitive effect of the merger.89
In addition, the 2010 Merger Guidelines were criticized for downplay-
ing or even marginalizing the role of market definition in merger analy-
sis,90 which prompted the Acting Attorney General to declare in an
August 2011 address that that was not the case.91 The court in United
States v. H&R Block, Inc., decided about a year after the new Guidelines
were issued, opined in a footnote that “[a]s a matter of applied econom-
ics, evaluation of unilateral effects does not require a market definition in
the traditional sense” but noted that as “a legal matter . . . a market defi-
nition may be required by Section 7.”92 It then observed that it was not
aware of any Section 7 case in which a court had dispensed with it.93
Of course, the Brown Shoe Court also articulated the “reasonable in-
terchangeability” standard for ascertaining “[t]he outer boundaries of a
product market.”94 That standard is frequently cited by lower courts as
the general or basic rule for defining a relevant product market.95 In ad-
because the acquisition was through the purchase of assets rather than stock, meaning that
Section 7 of the Clayton Act did not apply.
87. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)).
88. See, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 2016);
FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 156 (D.D.C 2000).
89. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Inexplica-
bly, the FTC now asserts a market definition is not necessary in a § 7 case . . . .”).
90. See, e.g., James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, “Tally-Ho!”: UPP and the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 587, 588–94, 597–98, 600–04 (2011).
91. Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Developments at the Antitrust Division and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines–One
Year Later 17, 19–23 (Nov. 17, 2011) (transcript available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/277488.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9WA-A86T]).
92. 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 84 n.35 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP ANTITRUST LAW 66 (3d ed. 2007) (citing Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324)).
93. Id.
94. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
95. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 117–18 (D.D.C. 2016) (reasona-
ble interchangeability “the basic rule.”); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 34 (D.D.C.
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dition, Brown Shoe’s observation that Section 7 requires consideration of
“probabilities, not certainties,”96 when assessing competitive impact is
oft-cited as a bedrock principle,97 as is its language that relevant market
definition requires “a pragmatic, factual approach . . . and not a formal,
legalistic one.”98 Similarly, Brown Shoe’s requirement that the relevant
geographic market must “‘correspond to the commercial realities’ of the
industry” under consideration and must “be economically significant” has
been influential.99
Brown Shoe also spoke of the potential for the existence of submarkets
within a broader market that could constitute product markets.100 Federal
courts have taken the possibility of the existence of submarkets to heart,
even though the “submarket” terminology emanating from Brown Shoe
is confusing at best and potentially misleading.101 For example, it is not
entirely clear whether the Brown Shoe Court considered that men’s, wo-
men’s, and children’s shoes were appropriate submarkets of the general
shoe market or whether the Court considered each to be its own product
market, especially since the Court declined to further delineate the mar-
ket by price or quality.102 As one court has stated, “[t]he term ‘sub-
market’ is somewhat of a misnomer, since the ‘submarket’ analysis simply
clarifies whether two products are in fact ‘reasonable’ substitutes and are
therefore part of the same market.”103
However, although maligned, submarkets were brought back to the
forefront by the so-called Unilateral Effects doctrine first identified in the
1992 DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.104 Those guidelines con-
2015) (reasonable interchangeability “the general rule”); H & R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at
50 (general rule); FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157 (D.D.C 2000)
(general rule); see also FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 2011).
96. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323.
97. See, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 467 (7th Cir. 2016);
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 337 (3d Cir. 2016); Saint Alphonsus
Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2015).
98. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336. See, e.g., Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d at
468; United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 193 (D.D.C. 2017); Allen v. Dairy
Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 338 (D. Vt. 2010); HTI Heath Servs. v. Quorum
Health Grp., 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1114–15 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
99. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 336–37 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Penn State Hershey
Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d at 338; Mich. Div.–Monument Builders of N. Am. v. Mich. Cemetary
Ass’n, 524 F.3d 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2008); Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 292 (9th
Cir. 1979); Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 202; Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d at 48; In re
Pool Prods. Distrib’n Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 940 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (E.D. La. 2013).
100. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
101. See IIB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTRITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 533, at 251 (3d ed.
2007) (“Courts sometimes describe the closest substitutes as a ‘submarket’ within a larger
‘market’ of less-close substitutes. Although degrees of constraint do in fact vary, the ‘mar-
ket’ for antitrust purposes is the one relevant to the particular legal issue at hand.”) (cita-
tions omitted).
102. The Court also declined to separate children’s shoes by gender or by age, e.g.,
infants’ shoes, since the market percentages were about the same. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at
326–28.
103. Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004).
104. See Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 35, at 50.
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tained a new section titled “Lessening of Competition through Unilateral
Effects,” which suggests the prospect of government challenges between
“close” competitors within markets for differentiated products solely be-
cause the closeness would enable the merged firm to raise prices on one
of the merging products without the need to show an anticompetitive im-
pact on the entire market.105 As a result, unilateral effects cases abound,
with courts struggling to determine whether close substitutes in fact are a
definable submarket.106
To its credit, the Brown Shoe Court did more than assert that sub-
markets may exist and delineated “practical indicia” as an analytical
guide.107 But the criteria created problems for the lower courts because
they appear open-ended with no guidance as to how they are to be
weighted.108 Fairly early on, the Ninth Circuit described them as “practi-
cal aids . . . rather than with the view that their presence or absence
would dispose, in talismanic fashion, of the submarket issue.”109 Indeed,
courts have found that submarkets exist even if only some of the indicia
are present.110
But the larger point is that Brown Shoe’s practical indicia have had a
profound impact on the submarket analyses in many merger cases. For
example, in FTC v. Swedish Match North America, Inc., the FTC sought
to enjoin a merger between two leading loose leaf tobacco manufacturers
despite the competition presented from moist snuff tobacco manufactur-
ers.111 The district court held that although there was some overlapping
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES § 2.2 (1992), www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLX2-
97EC].
106. See. e.g., Promedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 568–70 (6th Cir. 2014);
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2008); FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 246 F.3d 708, 717–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 61–70
(D.D.C. 2015); FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 68 (D.D.C. 2009); United
States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1117–18 (N.D. Cal. 2004); FTC v. Swedish
Match N. Am., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168–69 (D.D.C. 2000); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12
F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1998); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1074, 1083
(D.D.C. 1997); New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 360–61 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); United States v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. § 71,271 (N.D. Ill.
1995); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. § 71,405 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
107. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (“The boundaries of such a submarket may be deter-
mined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses,
unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors.”) (citing BETTY BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: A GUIDE TO
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 25–35 (1960)).
108. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 556 (2d ed. 2006) (“Brown Shoe failed to establish a workable
rule for weighing the various factors that determine a merger’s legality. That left merger
analysis open-ended—and allowed the Court to give determinative weight to any of the
listed factors.”); ROSS, supra note 73, at 338 (“[T]he open-textured nature of the analysis
requires judges to apply these standards with particular care.”).
109. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 932 (9th Cir. 1975).
110. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 308–09 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding
submarket based on industry recognition, peculiar characteristics of the product, and dif-
ferences in production methods and prices).
111. 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000).
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consumer usage of the products, “the weight of the evidence read in light
of Brown Shoe’s indicia convinces the Court that loose leaf chewing to-
bacco constitutes a distinct relevant product market.”112 More recently,
the court in FTC v. Sysco Corp., in blocking a merger between the top
two food service companies, undertook a detailed analysis of the Brown
Shoe factors in determining that broadline food service was not function-
ally interchangeable with broadline foodservice distribution.113 Other
courts have similarly applied the Brown Shoe indicia to conclude whether
a submarket either existed or not.114
Thus it is that one of the most denounced antitrust decisions from the
most derided antitrust era has come to be a foundational case in its field.
The reasons are several. Brown Shoe’s timing as the first post-Cellar-
Kefauver Amendments merger decision certainly is one. As noted, those
amendments were significant and reflected a congressional intent to
“plug the loophole” exempting asset acquisitions and expand the reach of
Section 7 to cover any merger which might have an anticompetitive im-
pact. As a result, the Brown Shoe Court’s lengthy and detailed descrip-
tion of the act’s legislative history was important in and of itself. Further,
many believe that the Court’s reading of that legislative history was
pretty accurate and reflected Congress’s concern more for the continuing
viability of small businesses that were being “gobbled up” by larger com-
panies than for lower prices.115
Faced with new legislation, the Court’s articulation of the standards for
assessing the relevant product and geographic markets were intended to
provide guidance and have done so. One can take issue with the Court’s
application of those standards to the facts before it and even with the
standards as being too open-ended, but it is difficult for lower courts to
ignore the fundamental approach set forth by the Court in interpreting a
significantly revised statute for the first time.
Third, the multifaceted and bipolar nature of the opinion means that
lower courts can pick and choose to a significant degree from the earlier
precedent. Thus, modern courts have elected to ignore Brown Shoe’s
112. Id. at 165.
113. 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27–33 (D.D.C. 2015).
114. See, e.g., Polypore Int’l, Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208, 1216–18 (11th Cir. 2012) (deep
cycle batteries one market); FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1037–38 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (premium, natural, and organic supermarkets (PNOS) a distinct submarket from
supermarkets in general); U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 995–99
(11th Cir. 1993) (Danforth brand anchors excluded from market for generic lightweight
anchors because of higher price); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792
F.2d 210, 218, (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp 2d 36, 51–60
(D.D.C. 2011); FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 39–44 (D.D.C. 2009); FTC v.
Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46–48 (D.D.C. 1998); cf. United States v. Gillette
Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that Brown Shoe “is distinguishable” in
refusing to hold that premium fountain pens in the $50 to $400 range constituted a distinct
submarket).
115. See supra text accompanying note 65; see also, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 550 (4th ed.
2011).
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populist notion about protecting small businesses while utilizing its ap-
proach to relevant market definition. As a result, it is likely that a court
today would come to the same relevant market determinations as did the
Brown Shoe Court but find no violation of Section 7 nonetheless. This is
because the Brown Shoe Court had a different view about likely competi-
tive impact than a court or the government enforcement agencies would
likely have today. That different view stems from a fundamental change
in merger ideology. A combined market share of 7.2% (or 2.3% if all
retail shoe outlets were included) would draw a yawn from today’s DOJ
or Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Consumer welfare in terms of lower
prices, higher quality, and a recognition that large firms are more efficient
and innovative have replaced earlier concerns about the viability of small
businesses and market trends toward concentration, no matter how small
an impact a merger has. Further, merger created efficiencies, while not
necessarily embraced, are at least not considered a negative.116
So, if Brown Shoe was a bad antitrust decision, it still certainly made
some good, or at least lasting, law. Of course, one can argue whether it
was truly a bad decision or simply a product of the Supreme Court’s
pretty accurate attempt to follow Congressional intent. In any event, the
decision certainly fit within the Warren Court’s antitrust mainstream,
with or without the Cellar-Kefauver amendments. But, at a minimum,
Brown Shoe is a case that persists as a foundational antitrust decision
even though it embodies values that have fundamentally shifted.117
V. ALCOA
Just as merger law begins with Brown Shoe, Judge Learned Hand’s
opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa)118 is
the start of the “modern” law of monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. And like Brown Shoe, Alcoa is much maligned for its
faulty reasoning and outcome. But, also like Brown Shoe, Alcoa has had
staying power, and although the law of monopolization has moved on, it
is unlikely to ever be overruled.
Alcoa ranks among the big five, along with Standard Oil,119 U.S.
116. Some modern courts have referred to Brown Shoe, however, when expressing
skepticism about proffered efficiency defenses. See, e.g., FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med.
Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Brown Shoe’s statement that “occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets” to support its skepticism about efficiency arguments); Saint Alphonsus Med.
Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2015)
(same).
117. But see, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc. 855 F.3d 345, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for following Brown Shoe in refusing effi-
ciency defense and arguing that circuit court should follow “the modern approach taken by
the Supreme Court and by this Court”).
118. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
119. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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Steel,120 AT&T,121 and Microsoft,122 in government antitrust challenges
that captured the public’s attention.123 It was the largest antitrust case in
a generation and involved a New Deal challenge to Alcoa’s monopoly of
the ever expanding aluminum industry.124 In the late 1800s and early
1900s, Alcoa, originally the Pittsburgh Reduction Company, acquired
patents that made possible the extraction of the metal alumina, aluminum
in its oxide state, from bauxite ore. Those processes made the production
of aluminum on a large scale commercially practical, and for all intents
and purposes, Alcoa had a monopoly on that technology and on the man-
ufacture of “virgin” aluminum ingot until 1909 when the last patent
expired.125
Alcoa, however, managed to maintain its domination of the domestic
aluminum ingot market thereafter by entering into restrictive covenants
in which power companies agreed not to sell or let power to any compet-
ing aluminum ingot manufacturers126 and by orchestrating international
cartels to keep foreign ingot out or to fix prices of any ingot that was
imported. These practices brought a government challenge and a subse-
quent consent decree, which was entered into in 1912.127
The consent decree was relatively modest in its impact, and Alcoa con-
tinued to dominate the aluminum ingot industry. It was subject to a pro-
longed Federal Trade Commission antitrust investigation in the 1920s, but
no litigation resulted. In 1937, the Antitrust Division, influenced by Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s renewed interest in market competition as a cure for the
Great Depression after the National Industrial Recovery Act had
floundered and then been declared unconstitutional, again challenged Al-
coa as having unlawfully maintained its monopoly over the aluminum in-
got market.128
120. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
121. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), and amended sub nom. United States v. W.
Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. United States
v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and modified sub nom. United States v. W.
Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 84 F. 3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
122. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
123. Brown Shoe arguably did not have the same level of public notoriety.
124. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department was created in 1933, but for its
first few years did relatively little to enforce the antitrust laws. Thurman Arnold’s appoint-
ment as head of the division changed all of that and began a period of aggressive enforce-
ment (although the case against Alcoa was brought by Robert Jackson just before Arnold
took office). For an account of Arnold’s impact as the head of the Antitrust Division, see
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 78–110 (2005).
125. The full history of Alcoa is told in CHARLES C. CARR, ALCOA: AN AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE (1952).
126. It apparently took a large amount of electrical energy to extract aluminum from
alumina. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1945).
127. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., Equity No. 159 (W.D. Pa. 1912), reprinted
in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST CASES, JULY 2, 1890 –JANUARY 1,
1918, at 341–50 (1918), abstract reprinted in ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES 1906-1966, at
217–18 (1968).
128. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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The trial began on June 1, 1938, and lasted for over two years, until
August 14, 1940. The trial judge then immediately issued an oral and then
written opinion dismissing all charges and exonerating the defendants in
every way.129
The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as then per-
mitted by the Expediting Act.130 The Court, however, lacked a quorum of
six justices to hear the case because at least four justices had previously
helped prosecute the case for the government.131 Congress finally re-
solved the quandary when it passed a statute designating the Second Cir-
cuit as the court of last resort to consider the government’s appeal.132
On March 12, 1945, the Second Circuit reversed the district court al-
most entirely and found Alcoa liable for monopolization of the aluminum
ingot market.133 In a detailed, wide-ranging opinion, Judge Hand crafted
landmark precedent for determining (1) what constitutes monopoly
power, (2) what kind of conduct by a monopolist makes it guilty of “mo-
nopolization” under the statute, and (3) when anticompetitive conduct
outside of the United States violates the Sherman Act.
Overall, the case greatly expanded the antitrust law in several ways. Its
adoption of the “effects” test gives rise to so-called extraterritorial juris-
diction for any anticompetitive conduct abroad that impacts U.S. com-
merce.134 Further, the opinion’s standard for measuring whether conduct
by a monopolist is exclusionary gave monopolists little wiggle room to
compete in the marketplace and thus expanded Section 2 of the Sherman
Act significantly.135 In addition, Judge Hand’s finding that monopolistic
intent is not a separate element of Section 2, since “no monopolist mono-
polizes unconscious of what he is doing,” also had the effect of broaden-
ing the statute’s reach by eliminating intent as a separate requirement.136
Although Judge Hand got much right in Alcoa, he also missed the mark
more than once, with the result that Alcoa is a mixed bag. On the plus
side, Judge Hand’s characterization of a 90% market share as a likely
monopoly, a 60% share as doubtful, and 33% as not a monopoly has
become a foundation of Section 2 jurisprudence. The effects test created
129. Id.
130. 15 U.S.C.S. § 29 (1944).
131. The Court was down to eight members at the time, leaving just four justices to
hear the case. Spencer Weber Waller, The Story of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of Mar-
ket Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases, in ANTITRUST STORIES 121, 129
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1944).
133. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416.
134. See, e.g., C. PAUL ROGERS III, STEPHEN CALKINS, MARK R. PATTERSON & WIL-
LIAM R. ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 1055–58 (4th ed. 2008).
135. One commentator has noted the irony of Judge Hand becoming an antitrust ex-
pansionist since earlier in his career he had little interest in judicial enforcement of the
Sherman Act. Waller, supra note 131, at 129–30. See also GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 206–09 (1994).
136. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432.
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controversy both here and abroad but it too has stood the test of time,137
and it is now the fundamental jurisdictional tool used to combat interna-
tional price-fixing and bid-rigging cartels.138
The negatives, however, are equally significant. Most believe that
Judge Hand badly missed the mark in his definition of the relevant prod-
uct market and, more crucially, in his characterization of what constitutes
exclusionary conduct by a firm found to be dominant.
Judge Hand narrowly defined the product market as limited to virgin
aluminum ingot, excluding so-called scrap or secondary ingot.139 He in-
cluded in that definition virgin ingot that Alcoa used for its own
fabrication purposes as well as that which it sold to third parties. In doing
so, he reasoned that all virgin ingot produced could impact demand and
so should be included in the relevant market.140 That certainly makes
sense, but he then veered off course by excluding secondary, i.e., scrap,
ingot from the relevant market while acknowledging that, for most pur-
poses, it competed with virgin ingot on an almost equal basis and in fact
probably set a ceiling on the price of the virgin variety.141
That meant that Alcoa controlled over 90% of the market; if Judge
Hand had included secondary ingot, Alcoa’s market share would have
been about 64% while if he had included secondary ingot and excluded
virgin ingot Alcoa fabricated itself, its market share would have hovered
around 33%.142 In other words, the exclusion of secondary ingot was es-
sential to determining that Alcoa was a monopolist.
Judge Hand’s reason for excluding scrap ingot related to the fact that
he viewed the amount of scrap on the market as within Alcoa’s control
since it dominated the production of virgin ingot. Accordingly, Alcoa
could forecast, whether accurately or not, the amount of scrap ingot that
would be on the market in future years and adjust its production of virgin
accordingly. Thus, “[t]he competition of ‘secondary’ must therefore be
disregarded, as soon as we consider the position of ‘Alcoa’ over a period
of years; it was as much within ‘Alcoa’s’ control as was the production of
the ‘virgin’ from which it had been derived.”143
137. See e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962); see also C. Paul Rogers III, A Comment on the Extraterritorial Application
of American Law in the 1990s, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR BERNHARD GROSSFELD ZUM 65,
Geburtstag 901 (Ulrich Hubner & Werner F. Ebke eds., 1999); C. Paul Rogers III, Still
Running Against the Wind: Comment on Antitrust Jurisdiction and Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 931 (1985).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1997).
139. Judge Hand had previous experience narrowly defining a relevant market. See
United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
140. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424.
141. Id.
142. Judge Hand acknowledged that it was “doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four per-
cent would be enough” to constitute a monopoly. Id.
143. Id. at 425.
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But Judge Hand seems to have gotten the scrap ingot issue exactly
wrong. First, the ability of Alcoa to actually forecast with any degree of
accuracy the amount of scrap ingot on the market ten or fifteen years
down the road was highly problematical considering all the variables that
would have to be accounted for.144 If, however, Alcoa could somehow
reasonably project the future supply of scrap ingot, that suggests that
scrap does in fact compete and thus should be in the relevant market, not
excluded from it.145
Judge Hand also refused to consider whether foreign produced ingot
beyond that already imported should be included in the relevant market.
He seemingly made the case for including foreign ingot sold elsewhere by
assuming that it did in fact place a ceiling on the prices Alcoa could
charge domestically, even though it was the sole American ingot pro-
ducer. However, he noted that tariffs and transportation costs put foreign
producers at a disadvantage, leaving Alcoa free to raise prices within
those limiting factors.146
Of course, some foreign ingot was coming into the United States; it
apparently made up about 10% of the market. This suggests that foreign
ingot was sold profitably in the United States and that the ceiling on Al-
coa’s prices to keep more foreign production out may have been quite
significant.147 Further, Judge Hand failed to consider that foreign produc-
ers may have had cost advantages, such as lower labor costs, that may
have offset the tariff and transportation disadvantage.
Additionally, Judge Hand failed to consider whether substitute metals
should be included within the relevant market or parts of it. As Alcoa
had successfully expanded the uses for aluminum to products previously
made from other metals, it would stand to reason that aluminum ingot
competed with those metals for some end uses.148
There is evidence that the Supreme Court did not know what to make
of Judge Hand’s relevant market analysis. In United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., the so-called Cellophane case, the Court defined the
relevant product market quite broadly to include all flexible wrapping
products, refusing to limit the market to cellophane even though it was
much more expensive, had superior physical qualities, and was heavily
favored by some end users.149 The Court noted that Judge Hand “refused
to consider the close competition offered by ‘secondary’ (used) alumi-
num” because of Alcoa’s ability to regulate the scrap version by reason of
its control of virgin ingot.150 As a result, the Court noted that Alcoa was
“not particularly helpful” to the market definition issue before it.151 Sub-
144. See id.
145. HOVENKAMP, supra note 115, at 136.
146. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 426.
147. HOVENKAMP, supra note 115, at 119.
148. Waller, supra note 131, at 131 n.28.
149. 351 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1956).
150. Id. at 395 n.23.
151. Id.
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sequent Supreme Court decisions simply ignored Alcoa when determin-
ing the relevant product market, even when drawing the market
narrowly.152
Having concluded that Alcoa was indeed a monopolist, Judge Hand
went on to consider whether it had acted in a manner that brought it
within Section 2’s prohibition against monopolization. But first, he set the
stage by engaging in a lengthy political, economic, moral, and social dis-
course about the antitrust laws in which he concluded that they “pre-
fer[ed] a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon
his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those en-
gaged must accept the direction of a few.”153 Thus, he concluded, “it has
been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organiza-
tion of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other.”154
Thus, since monopolies were undesirable, Hand saw little room for mo-
nopolists to compete in the market without running afoul of the forbid-
den monopolization language of Section 2. He suggested that a
monopolist might have had its power “thrust upon it” or might have
achieved dominance “merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry” and therefore might be given some latitude.155 Otherwise, how-
ever, Hand saw little space for a monopolist seeking to maintain its domi-
nance to maneuver in the marketplace.156 In fact, it is quite telling that
most contemporary commentators understood Alcoa to hold that the pos-
session of monopoly power alone was a violation of Section 2.157
That reading of Alcoa is understandable given both Judge Hand’s gen-
eral approach and the specifics of his finding that the defendant had en-
gaged in monopolistic conduct. Previous Section 2 case law had required
some almost morally repugnant conduct, acts that could be considered
predatory against competitors, or an independent Section 1 offense to
152. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Int’l Boxing Club of
N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959). But see Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
33 F.3d 194, 202–03 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding the Alcoa Court’s analysis in excluding secon-
dary ingot “persuasive” in supporting its exclusion of IBM leased computers from the rele-
vant market).
153. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (1945).
154. Id. at 429.
155. Id. at 429–30.
156. “[I]ts [a monopolist’s] mere existence might be thought not to constitute an exer-
cise of that power. That distinction is nevertheless purely formal; it would be valid only so
long as the monopoly remained wholly inert; it would disappear as soon as the monopoly
began to operate . . . .” Id. at 428.
157. See, e.g., Walter Adams, The Sherman Act and Its Enforcement, 14 U. PITT. L.
REV. 319, 329–30 (1953); Walter Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyr-
rhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1951); Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman
Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 577 (1947); Robert W.
Harbeson, A New Phase of the Antitrust Law, 45 MICH. L. REV. 977, 986 (1947); Dudley L.
Miller, Note, Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 54 YALE L.J. 860, 861 (1945).
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find a violation.158 But Judge Hand went so far as to appear to shift the
burden to the defendant, once proved a monopolist, to prove that it had
not abused its power.159 He then focused on the fact that Alcoa had antic-
ipated increases in demand for ingot and concluded that “[n]othing com-
pelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others
entered the field. . . . [W]e can think of no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened . . . .”160
Although Judge Hand had, earlier in his opinion, observed that “[t]he
successful competitor . . . must not be turned upon when he wins,” he did
not really mean it.161 He arguably tipped his hand when he observed that
Alcoa in 1940 was anything but “the passive beneficiary of a monopoly,
following upon an involuntary elimination of competitors by automati-
cally operative economic forces.”162 If taken literally to mean that a mo-
nopolist must show its dominant market position was passive to avoid
liability, Section 2 comes very close to becoming a no conduct statute.
At a minimum, Judge Hand asserted that a monopolist cannot aggres-
sively compete for new business in the marketplace and take advantage,
in his words, of “a great organization, having the advantage of experi-
ence, trade connections and the elite of personnel.”163 Instead, it must
defer to smaller rivals rather than seek new business or run the risk of
violating Section 2. Thus, one could scarcely adopt a standard more hos-
tile to firms with dominant economic power. The message is that the
more successful a firm is, the greater its antitrust risk, at least if it has
market power.
Alcoa’s approach to determining an exclusionary conduct standard had
a profound effect on the law for decades. Initially the Supreme Court
enthusiastically endorsed the Alcoa opinion, quoting several paragraphs
from it in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,164 a criminal conspiracy
to monopolize case. In a statement largely ignored today, the Court held
that “[n]either proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of
actual exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain
a charge of monopolization under the Sherman Act.”165 Two years later,
the Court in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, another case
158. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Compare United
States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927), with United States v. U. S. Steel Corp,
251 U.S. 417 (1920). See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 101, ¶ 614, at 34.
159. In the context of holding that the government did not have the burden of proof to
establish Alcoa’s profit for virgin ingot, Judge Hand said in part, “Having proved that
‘Alcoa’ had a monopoly of the domestic ingot market, the plaintiff had gone far enough; if
it was an excuse, that ‘Alcoa’ had not abused its power, it lay upon ‘Alcoa’ to prove that it
had not.” Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427.
160. Id. at 431.
161. Id. at 430.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 431.
164. 328 U.S. 781, 813–14 (1946).
165. Id. at 810. At a minimum, this language suggests that one does not have to show
that a monopolist used its monopoly power to exclude rivals or the actual exclusion of
competitors from a monopolist’s exclusionary conduct.
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ignored today, read Alcoa as holding that “[t]he mere existence of the
power to monopolize, together with the purpose or intent to do so, con-
stitutes an evil at which the Act is aimed.”166 It is hard to imagine lan-
guage which comes closer to a no conduct Section 2.
The same year, in United States v. Griffith, the Supreme Court made it
clear that a monopolist does not have to commit a separate Section 1
violation to engage in exclusionary conduct.167 In addition, the Court re-
lied heavily on Alcoa when it stated that “[i]t follows a fortiori that the
use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competi-
tion, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is un-
lawful.”168 Thus, the Court recognized that Section 2 outlawed monopoly
maintenance, even by a firm that achieved market domination on the
merits.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., another influential
Section 2 case even though on the district court level, Judge Wyzanski
characterized Alcoa as holding “that one who has acquired an over-
whelming share of the market ‘monopolizes’ whenever he does business,
apparently even if there is no showing that his business involves any ex-
clusionary practice.”169
Subsequently, in United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme Court,
while not directly citing Alcoa, certainly extrapolated from it when it de-
fined exclusionary conduct as “the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”170
That language, which derives from Alcoa, has become the standard defi-
nition.171 Of course, its application has dramatically shifted as the Court’s
attitude about monopolies has likewise undergone a major overhaul.
That change was certainly fueled by the ascent of the Chicago School in
the 1970s whose adherents took umbrage at the idea imbedded in Alcoa
that successful competitors could be turned upon when they succeed even
at the cost of higher prices and the shoring up of less efficient firms.172
For example, Richard Posner described Alcoa’s “theory of monopoliza-
tion [as] a bad one because it encourages inefficient conduct”173 while
Robert Bork called the decision “a thoroughly perverse judicial tour de
force” for much the same reasons.174
166. 334 U.S. 110, 130 (1948).
167. 334 U.S. 100, 106–07 (1948).
168. Id. at 107.
169. 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D.C. Mass. 1953) (citation omitted). Judge Wyzanski went
on to note that the doctrine was “softened” by Judge Hand’s recognition that a defendant
could avoid liability if it showed that its dominance was due solely to superior skill or
products, economic or technical efficiencies, or natural advantages. Id.
170. 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
171. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techn. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992)
(citing Grinnell and Alcoa for definition of exclusionary conduct).
172. See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regula-
tion, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 286 (1956).
173. POSNER, supra note 74, at 262.
174. BORK, supra note 72, at 170.
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One of the first judicial breaks from Alcoa occurred in Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.175 where the plaintiff alleged that Kodak, as a
monopolist in the sale of “amateur conventional still cameras” and cam-
era film, had an obligation to competitors when it sought to introduce a
new Instamatic camera to the market.176 That obligation was to predisc-
lose the new product in time for competitors to also enter the market
with copies of the new product. Plaintiffs had argued that Alcoa sup-
ported its position because although Alcoa had argued that it “positively
assisted competitors,” Judge Hand could “find no instance of its helping
prospective ingot manufacturers.”177
The Second Circuit, however, forcefully held that Kodak had no duty
to share its innovations with competitors.178 Kodak, even though a mo-
nopolist, was entitled to the lead time in the market that a new product
produces. According to the court, “a monopolist is permitted, and indeed
encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits.”179 Whatever
successes it may have had from invention and innovation, the court held,
could not create antitrust liability.180 Thus, unlike Alcoa, the Second Cir-
cuit recognized that there were no special limits or constraints on a mo-
nopolist’s ability to compete.181
The Seventh Circuit subsequently reaffirmed the break with Alcoa in
no uncertain terms. In Olympic Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., Judge Posner noted that since in Alcoa the defendant was
condemned for expanding capacity to meet new industry demand, it pre-
sumably could have charged higher prices free from antitrust scrutiny if it
had chosen to keep demand down to a level that it could supply without
increasing its capacity.182 Judge Posner then noted the shift in antitrust
policy “from the protection of competition as a process of rivalry to the
protection of competition as a means of promoting economic
efficiency.”183
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit characterized Alcoa as standing for the pro-
position that a monopolist could be held liable for being efficient and
noted that the notion “has been questioned by just about everyone who
has taken a close look at it.”184
175. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
176. Id. at 267–68.
177. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
178. Berkey Photo, Inc., 603 F.2d at 285.
179. Id. at 280. Accord, Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 535,
544 (9th Cir. 1983); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1107–08
(7th Cir. 1983).
180. Berkey Photo, Inc., 603 F.2d at 281.
181. See, e.g., Saul P. Morgenstern, Jennifer B. Patterson & Terri A. Mazur, Antitrust
Jurisprudence in the Second Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 117 (2016).
182. 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986). Presumably, Judge Posner meant that Alcoa
could have constrained itself from developing new uses for aluminum but charged higher
prices as a monopolist for existing demand.
183. Id.
184. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
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In recent years the Supreme Court has also distanced itself from Al-
coa’s view of monopolies as inherently bad, as well as its take on exclu-
sionary conduct. In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, quoted the “willful acqui-
sition or maintenance” language of exclusionary conduct from Grinnell,
which is derived from Aloca.185 However, he went on to immediately de-
part from Alcoa’s “big is inherently bad” philosophy by describing the
possession of monopoly power and the charging of monopoly prices as
not only legal but vital to the free market system. In the Court’s current
view, the opportunity to charge monopoly prices attracts “business acu-
men” and induces innovation and economic growth.186
Thus, Trinko represents a total about-face from Alcoa. The Court now
views monopolies as desirable, not inherently evil. Although the language
of what constitutes exclusionary conduct remains the same, its application
to the conduct of a monopolist could hardly differ more. The Trinko
Court went on to hold that generally monopolists have no obligation “to
share the source of their advantage” with rivals and, in fact, can normally
refuse to deal with them at all.187 Thus, in the Trinko Court’s view, Al-
coa’s increasing its production capacity to meet the new demand that it
had created would be considered crucial to the competitive process. Forc-
ing Alcoa to step aside to allow competitors to reap the rewards of its
efforts to spur economic growth would be considered anathema to it.
More recently, in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communica-
tions, Inc., the Supreme Court distanced itself more directly from Alcoa
in rejecting a price squeeze claim.188 The Alcoa court had ruled that Al-
coa’s use of its monopoly power in the upstream aluminum ingot market
to squeeze profits of downstream aluminum sheet fabricators was unlaw-
ful.189 The LinkLine Court did not try to distinguish Alcoa but dismissed
it, stating “[g]iven developments in economic theory and antitrust juris-
prudence since Alcoa, we find our recent decisions in Trinko and Brooke
Group more pertinent to the question before us.”190
But those rejections of Alcoa’s economic rationale and reasoning are
not likely its death knell. Judge Hand’s opinion was so expansive that
185. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 407–08. The exception, which was recognized in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985), occurs when there is no business justifi-
cation for the refusal other than to harm a competitor. Trinko regarded even this as “at or
near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
188. 555 U.S. 438, 442 (2009). The plaintiff had alleged that the vertically integrated
defendant was setting a high wholesale price to provide access to digital subscriber line
(DSL) providers to telephone lines while charging a low retail price for its own DSL ser-
vice. Id. at 443–44.
189. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 436–38 (2d Cir. 1945).
190. LinkLine, 555 U.S. at 452 n.3. Alcoa had been the foundation of a number of
unsuccessful price squeeze claims over the years in the circuit courts. See, e.g., Schor v.
Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398
F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2002);
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
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there is almost always something there for every litigant. One can cer-
tainly argue that the opinion is rife with inconsistencies and thus can be
used to support just about any position.191 For example, Judge Hand
notes that the law should not turn upon the successful competitor when
he wins while at the same time asserting that the Sherman Act favors
small competitors to large ones.192 But, in his defense, he was likely at-
tempting to fine tune the law of monopolization and describe, in the con-
text of his view of the evils of dominant economic power, just when the
law should turn on the successful competitor or, stated another way, what
kind of conduct a monopolist could engage in.
His recognition that some monopolists may have had their power
“thrust upon” them or that they may have obtained power through “su-
perior skill, foresight and industry” has, not surprisingly but somewhat
ironically, given Section 2 defendants something to hang their hats on.193
That is, the case that most expands the reach of Section 2 and most con-
strains the competitive zeal of monopolists also provides ready defenses
to claims brought under the section.194
As noted, in his far-reaching opinion Judge Hand also famously opined
on the question of the requisite intent, holding, “We disregard any ques-
tion of ‘intent.’”195 What he apparently meant was that “specific” intent
is not required for a Section 2 offense since “no monopolist monopolizes
unconscious of what he is doing.”196 Thus, here Judge Hand advances the
ball and simplifies the analysis. He holds that Section 2 does not require a
finding of intent separate and apart from the focus on the monopolist’s
conduct. That ruling continues to be a foundational part of Section 2
analysis.197
Similarly, Judge Hand’s characterization of the market share necessary
for a firm to be considered a monopolist continues to have contemporary
influence, although courts recognize that factors other than market share
are often relevant.198 That is, Judge Hand’s statement that “it is doubtful
whether . . . sixty-four percent would be enough” to establish monopoly
191. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 108, at 114 (“The apparently contradic-
tory dicta in Judge Hand’s opinion left a somewhat muddled rule of that case for determin-
ing what constitutes improper conduct.”); ROSS, supra note 73, at 27.
192. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427, 430.
193. Id. at 429–30.
194. See, e.g., Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Vill. of E. Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2002);
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547–48 (9th Cir. 1991); Arthur
S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1431 (6th Cir. 1990); Telex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 926–27 (10th Cir. 1975).
195. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431.
196. Id. at 432.
197. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602
(1985); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 840 (11th Cir. 2015); Cascade Health Sols. v.
PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 904 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a
monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the
monopolist’s conduct.”).
198. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 935 (6th Cir. 2005).
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power199 is generally regarded as a starting point but not dispositive of
the question, as there is a recognition that in certain circumstances a firm
with below 50% of the market could have the power to drive rivals from
the market.200
Thus, Alcoa’s contemporary influence extends to the breadth of Sec-
tion 2 analysis and, of course, includes the extraterritorial jurisdictional
effects test Judge Hand articulated apart from Section 2. It is a case that is
not going away anytime soon in spite of the fact that the good judge bol-
lixed the relevant market definition and sought to handcuff the ability of
monopolists to compete.
VI. ALCOA AND BROWN SHOE CONSIDERED TOGETHER
Alcoa and Brown Shoe are both seriously flawed decisions, probably
when decided and certainly when viewed through the prism of modern
antitrust law. Both reflect the discarded view that market power, without
more, is inherently bad for the marketplace. Both represent an aggressive
expansionist view of antitrust. Both, at a minimum, view efficiency gains
with suspicion. Both embrace a definition of competition that seeks to
protect the viability of small competitors; the decisions are thus, concomi-
tantly, little concerned with the associated higher prices, increased costs,
and consumer harm. Both contain significant internal inconsistencies.
Both would be decided differently today because the slight increase in
Brown Shoe’s market share would not trigger any enforcement agency
interest, and Alcoa’s conduct would not be deemed exclusionary under
current standards.
Yet both, despite their flaws, set forth antitrust doctrine that remains
influential today. If we label them bad decisions because they were
wrongly decided, they have indeed made good law, albeit for different
reasons. Brown Shoe’s flaw was not in setting a legal standard for merger
review but rather in the application of that standard to the facts before it
(and its attempt to protect both competition and small competitors). That
legal standard has persevered even though merger enforcement looks
very different today, both philosophically and practically.
As a result of Alcoa’s internal inconsistencies, it has always been diffi-
cult to parse out how much competitive latitude Judge Hand believed
monopolists should have. But Alcoa also set a legal standard for ascer-
taining exclusionary conduct that remains through its subsequent adop-
tion in Grinnell, although the meaning and application of that standard
has shifted dramatically as the Supreme Court’s view of monopoly power
has changed. As in Brown Shoe, Judge Hand’s application of the standard
to the facts before him were questionable then and today reflect an out-
moded view of the constraints on monopolists to aggressively compete.
199. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424.
200. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 108, at 107 (asserting that, in general, a firm
with 60% of the market should be considered a monopolist).
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So bad antitrust decisions can and do make good law. They do so by
crafting legal principles or standards that form the analytic basis for the
assessment of marketplace conduct. But the devil, as they say, is in the
details. In antitrust law, economic thinking (and most would agree eco-
nomic sophistication) has evolved, and thus the application of general le-
gal standards to competitive marketplace behavior is viewed through
different economic lenses. That changes outcomes. Cases that previously
ran afoul of the Sherman or Clayton Acts don’t necessarily do so any-
more as more focus on consumer welfare as the sole antitrust goal has, in
fact, constricted the antitrust laws.
But what accounts for the staying power of Brown Shoe and Alcoa
when other bad antitrust decisions, though not overruled, are pretty
much ignored and forgotten? It does have a lot to do with timing. It is no
surprise that both cases are considered the first modern decisions in their
areas. As noted, Brown Shoe was the first case to reach the Supreme
Court after the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Anti-merger Act of 1950, which sig-
nificantly amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, while Alcoa was the first
major Section 2 case brought by the government in a generation and was
one of the first major antitrust cases brought by the relatively new Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department. Thus, both had gaps to fill when
they reached the court of last resort and jurists wrote both opinions to do
just that by articulating broad legal standards for future application.
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus, general legal principles articulated in bad decisions can, and
sometimes do, remain as legal constructs moving forward in spite of
wrong outcomes. Those bad decisions, far from being overruled, continue
to have life even though when one deconstructs those decisions they re-
main bad decisions, then and now, based on their facts. They are, in fact,
saved from oblivion by their articulation of general legal rules or princi-
ples. The fact that both the Brown Shoe and Alcoa courts blew it in the
application of those principles has not diminished their influence down
the road, in spite of withering criticism and a fundamental shift in anti-
trust policy.
